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ABSTRACT 
Protectors who do harm are often punished more severely because their crime is 
perceived as a betrayal of trust. Two experiments test whether this will generalize to 
protectors who incur harm while serving in their protective role, and if not, whether 
collective guilt for the harm they suffered provides an explanation. Study 1 tested 
competing hypotheses that a veteran (versus civilian) with PTSD would be punished 
either more harshly because of the trust betrayal, or more leniently because of increased 
guilt about the harm the veteran suffered during war. Men and women were both more 
lenient toward a veteran (versus civilian) but this effect was mediated by collective guilt 
only among men. In Study 2, guilt inductions increased leniency among participants less 
likely to classify the veteran as an in-group member (women, low national identifiers), 
but not in those who are more likely to classify the veteran as an in-group member (men, 
high national identifiers), who were lenient without any guilt inductions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
We bestow certain groups and their members with both the great responsibility to 
protect us, but also great trust in their authority. What happens when such individuals 
violate the trust society bestows upon them by committing a crime?  Past research has 
shown that people are particularly averse to betrayal by individuals in a protective role 
(Koehler & Gershoff, 2003). We test whether this betrayal aversion would persist if the 
protector’s betrayal was a result of harm incurred while performing his or her protective 
duties.  On the one hand, the public might still be more condemning of the protector’s 
crime compared to a civilian who has not been given a protector role, because of the 
undeniable breach of trust.  On the other hand, the public might be more lenient because 
they feel collective guilt for the harm the protector incurred in the line of duty that 
contributed to their breach of trust. People often feel guilty about their group’s 
transgressions against other groups and, consequently, are motivated to compensate the 
victims –even if they themselves played no direct role (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & 
Manstead, 1998). We extend this literature to assess whether people can also feel guilt 
when their group has harmed its own group members and whether this will similarly 
motivate compensatory behaviors toward the harmed in-group members. We test this 
possibility in the context of the public’s decisions regarding appropriate punishment for 
war veterans who develop Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) during combat and, as 
a result, commit a violent crime after returning home. More specifically, we investigated 
whether people would be more or less punitive toward a U.S. veteran whose violent 
crime resulted from combat-related PTSD, relative to a civilian who committed the same 
2 
crime as a result of non-combat-related PTSD. In addition, we investigated collective 
guilt as a psychological explanation. 
Protectors and Betrayal 
When it comes to violations of trust, some perpetrators elicit more anger and more 
punitiveness than others (Joskowicz-Jabloner & Leiser, 2013). If crimes directly 
contradict the positive behavior that is expected of a perpetrator’s profession, people feel 
that their trust has been betrayed and react more punitively than if the same crime was 
committed by someone of whom society does not have such positive expectations 
(Koehler & Gershoff, 2003). For example, participants were more punitive toward a 
campus police officer (vs. construction worker) who committed rape, a security guard 
(vs. janitor) who committed robbery, a military general (vs. orchestra conductor) who 
committed treason, and a daycare worker (vs. grocery clerk) who molested a child. 
Protectors who broke a promise by committing a crime violated people’s general sense of 
social order and social norms, which increased punitiveness to restore perceptions of a 
safe, orderly society. We extend this research by testing competing hypotheses regarding 
whether reading about a war veteran (vs. civilian) defendant with PTSD who committed a 
crime will replicate previous research and demonstrate greater punitiveness or, 
alternatively, leniency.  
Punitiveness towards veterans. U.S. military personnel might be held to higher 
behavioral standards than civilians. Eighty-four percent of Americans surveyed between 
1987-2007 view the U.S. military favorably (PEW Research Center, 2007). In fact, 
military personnel might be held to even higher standards than other individuals entrusted 
with a duty to protect in non-military professions: the U.S. military is both the most 
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respected government institution and also the most trusted (Leal, 2005). These highly 
favorable impressions of military personnel might make a veteran who commits a crime a 
particularly egregious perpetrator as their crime can be perceived as a betrayal of deep 
public trust. Furthermore, the positive perceptions of veterans might represent a form of 
elevated social status, which has also been shown to predict more punitive reactions in 
the context of a high (vs. low) status individual committing a transgression (Fragale, 
Rosen, Xu, & Merideth, 2009). This previous research led to the hypothesis that a veteran 
will be punished more severely than a civilian for the same crime.  
Leniency towards veterans. Previous research investigating protectors who 
transgress might not generalize to war veterans committing crimes. We investigate a 
potential boundary condition to previous findings that might reverse the betrayer-of-trust 
effect: people might be more lenient toward veterans, relative to civilians, because they 
feel guilty about the trauma they experienced while performing their protective duty. 
Veterans with wartime experience belong to a unique category of protector, who put their 
own personal health and safety at particularly perilous risk in order to protect the health 
and safety of others. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for the physical and 
psychological risks to become reality and for these protectors to incur serious harm. 
PTSD affects approximately 1 in 5 veterans of the recent war in Iraq (Litz & Schlenger, 
2009) and 40% of veterans surveyed recently report experiencing post-traumatic stress—-
a highly publicized phenomenon of which the public is well aware (PEW Research 
Center, 2011). The public’s awareness of the harm that protectors suffer in fulfilling their 
protective duty might make people react more leniently toward a protector who commits 
a crime. People might feel collective guilt for a veteran’s traumatic experiences while 
4 
protecting them during war, and as a result, might be more lenient toward the veteran 
relative to a civilian who commits the same crime. To our knowledge, no one has 
investigated whether previous demonstrations of increased punitiveness toward protectors 
extend to (a) war veterans, or (b) protectors who incurred harm in the line of duty. We 
test whether the experience of collective guilt toward the harmed protector might 
eliminate—or even reverse—the increased punitiveness demonstrated in past research.  
Collective guilt and in-group self-harm. Guilt occurs as a result of a perceived 
illegitimate harm done unto another and a sense of personal responsibility for that harm 
(Weiner, 1995). Yet, guilt can also occur at the collective level for group transgressions. 
Collective guilt is distinguishable from the personal guilt an individual might experience 
for his or her own transgressions (Doosje et al., 1998). Collective guilt occurs as a result 
of perceived illegitimate transgressions of the individual’s in-group, even if that 
individual bears no personal responsibility for the group’s behavior. People experiencing 
collective guilt are more willing to compensate people harmed by their in-group 
compared to those who are not experiencing collective guilt. For example, Dutch students 
who read about the negative consequences of the Dutch colonization of Indonesia (e.g., 
labor exploitation, killings) experienced more collective guilt, and were more willing to 
compensate Indonesians for the harm done, compared to Dutch students who did not read 
this information (Doosje et al., 1998). Even though the Dutch students themselves played 
no role in the colonization of Indonesia, experiencing collective guilt for the actions of 
their group motivated compensatory behaviors. The extant literature on the phenomenon 
of collective guilt has primarily concerned inter-group perceptions and behaviors (e.g., 
Branscombe, 2004; Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 
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2006). That is, researchers have investigated the impact of perpetrators’ collective guilt 
toward a victimized out-group.  
In the current studies we explore a related, but novel, question. Rather than focus 
on collective guilt and compensation toward an out-group victimized by one’s in-group, 
we test whether collective guilt can be experienced for harm inflicted on the in-group by 
the in-group, thereby addressing a gap that has been identified in the collective guilt 
literature (Sullivan et al., 2013). That is, if an individual’s group harms some of its own 
members (i.e., in-group self-harm)—even if that individual bore no personal 
responsibility—will the individual experience collective guilt and make reparations in the 
form of leniency in punishment if the harmed in-group member commits a crime? We 
address this gap by investigating whether American civilians might feel guilt about the 
harm their in-group (i.e., America) caused to its members by sending them to war, and 
whether this guilt would lead to reparations (i.e., leniency toward a veteran with PTSD 
who commits a violent crime).  
Although no one has directly tested this hypothesis, relevant literature provides 
indirect support. When Americans read about how the U.S. invasion and subsequent 
occupation of Iraq led to many American casualties (i.e., in-group self-harm), they, 
ironically, felt more collective guilt about harm inflicted on the people of Iraq (i.e., out-
group harm) than if they had read about the out-group harm or no harm (Sullivan et al., 
2013). That is, reading about harm their in-group caused itself increased collective guilt 
toward the out-group. This effect is likely to generalize to collective guilt toward the in-
group—in fact, it might be an even stronger effect. That is, contemplating in-group self-
harm might increase collective guilt toward the in-group even more than collective guilt 
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toward the out-group. Why? People can avoid collective guilt toward out-groups with 
exonerating cognitions, such as justification for or minimization of the harm (Miron, 
Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010; Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006). To the extent that 
people see their in-group members as part of their collective selves, minimizing or 
justifying the harm might be more difficult with in-group members because harm to one’s 
self is often perceived as more severe and less legitimate than harm to others 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Stillwell & Baumeister, 1997).  
If leniency toward veterans is indeed driven by collective guilt toward in-group 
members who incurred harm while serving a protective role, then the effect should 
depend on the likelihood that one classifies the harmed protector as an in-group member. 
Because in-group members are seen as more deserving of favorable treatment than out-
group members (Turner et al., 1987), collective guilt might be more likely to translate to 
lenient punishment among participants who more readily categorize the harmed protector 
as an in-group member. For example, men might be more likely to experience collective 
guilt and seek reparations for war veterans than women. The U.S. military is a male-
dominated government institution, with the ranks composed of approximately 86% men 
(Patten & Parker, 2011). Men might be more likely to categorize the veteran as an in-
group member than are women and therefore be more likely to believe the veteran is 
deserving of favorable treatment. As a result, men’s collective guilt toward the veteran 
might motivate them to seek reparations for the harm in the form of leniency. Thus, 
although all Americans might experience some level of collective guilt for America’s 
self-harming of U.S. veterans, we predicted that collective guilt about injured veterans 
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might better explain leniency in men’s (vs. women’s) punishment decisions about a 
veteran transgressor. 
Overview of the Present Studies  
 Across two experiments we investigated punitiveness towards protectors who 
commit a crime as a result of harm they incurred while in their protective role. In Study 
1, we tested competing hypotheses regarding whether people will punish a war veteran 
with PTSD who commits a violent crime more or less than a civilian with PTSD. We also 
assessed whether this differential punishment would be mediated by participants’ 
collective guilt for the transgressor’s trauma. In Study 2, we tested the effect of 
experimentally inducing individual and/or collective guilt toward veterans in general, on 
punishment of a war veteran who commits a crime. Across both studies we tested 
whether the role of collective guilt in punishment depended on the likelihood that 
participants might classify the war veteran as an in-group member (i.e., based on gender, 
Studies 1-2; and national identification as an American, Study 2). 
Study 1 
Participants read a criminal trial summary depicting either a civilian or a veteran 
defendant who had been diagnosed with PTSD and subsequently committed a violent 
crime. Participants made judgments concerning the appropriate verdict for the defendant 
as well as completing a measure of our predicted mediator (i.e., collective guilt). We 
tested two competing hypotheses: 
Punitive Hypothesis: Consistent with previous research demonstrating that 
people are more punitive toward protectors who commit harm (Koehler & 
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Gershoff, 2003), participants will be more punitive towards the veteran defendant 
compared to the civilian defendant.  
Leniency Hypothesis: In contrast to previous research, participants will be more 
lenient towards the veteran defendant compared to the civilian defendant. If this 
hypothesis is supported, we predicted a moderated mediation model, such that 
participants will experience more collective guilt for a veteran’s PTSD (vs. a 
civilian’s PTSD), which, in turn, will decrease their punitiveness. We predicted 
that this meditation effect would be stronger for male participants than for female 
participants because they are more likely to classify the veteran as an in-group 
member.  
Study 1 Method 
Participants 
A sample of 265 participants was recruited online through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (M-Turk) to complete the mock criminal trial online. Participants were excluded 
from analyses for failing manipulation and attention checks (n = 78), being a veteran (n = 
9), or having a felony on their criminal record (n = 4). The final sample included 174 
participants (45% female; 81% White/Caucasian, 9% Asian/Asian American, 6% 
Black/African American, 3% Hispanic/Latino, and 1% Other; Mage = 34 years, SD = 11). 
Participants were randomly assigned to the veteran defendant condition (n = 89) or 
civilian defendant condition (n = 85) and were compensated $0.75 for their participation. 
Procedure 
After providing consent, participants were instructed to envision themselves in the 
role of a juror in a criminal court case and to read a trial summary, which included 
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summaries of opening statements, the prosecution’s and defense’s case, and closing 
arguments, as well as post-trial pattern jury instructions. Participants then completed the 
dependent variable measures, manipulation and attention checks, and demographic 
information (see Appendix A for trial stimulus and measures).  
Materials and Measures 
Trial stimulus.  In the opening statements, the prosecution argued that the 
defendant should be found guilty of murder in the second degree and the defense argued 
that the defendant should be found guilty of the more lenient charge of manslaughter. The 
prosecution’s case described how the defendant had an altercation with another man, 
which resulted in the defendant beating the victim to death. The defense’s case suggested 
the defendant was provoked and that he responded violently because of PTSD caused by 
a prior trauma. Within the defense’s case, we manipulated whether the PTSD was a result 
of combat in Afghanistan or of witnessing a bank robbery, which contributed to the 
killing.  The trauma stories were kept nearly identical, changing only minor details to 
alter the context of the traumatic event.  The defense’ case also detailed several PTSD 
symptoms (e.g., sleep problems, quick to anger, etc.) and included an official PTSD 
diagnosis. Closing arguments reiterated the prosecution’s and defense’s requests for a 
verdict of murder and manslaughter, respectively. The post-trial jury instructions 
provided information on what constitutes murder in the second degree, and what 
constitutes manslaughter (Stevenson & Bottoms, 2009). 
Punitiveness. Participants indicated their verdict preference (Murder in the 
Second Degree or Voluntary Manslaughter) and then confidence in their verdict on an 
11-point scale ranging from 0% Confident to 100% Confident. We combined these two 
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measures to create a 200-point continuous bi-polar punitiveness scale ranging from -100 
(100% confident in manslaughter verdict) to +100 (100% confidence in a murder 
verdict). 
Collective Guilt Scale. Six items assessed participants’ level of collective guilt 
for the defendant’s trauma and the extent to which they felt the defendant should be 
compensated.  This scale was inspired by a previous measure of collective guilt (Powell, 
Branscombe & Schmitt, 2005), which we modified to fit the current study context. Each 
item was rated on a 7-point scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree (e.g., “As an 
American I feel guilt about the traumatic events the defendant experienced”, α = .89). 
Study 1 Results and Discussion 
Punitiveness 
To test our competing hypotheses regarding whether reading about a veteran (vs. 
civilian) would lead to a more punitive or more lenient punishment, we conducted a 2 x 2 
(Defendant Veteran Status [veteran, civilian] x (Participant Gender [male, female]) 
between-subjects Analysis Of Variance (ANOVA). See Table 1 for all descriptive 
statistics. Participants were less punitive (M = -36.42, SD = 74.98) when the defendant 
was a veteran, compared to when the defendant was a civilian (M = -6.60, SD = 80.55), 
F(1, 170) = 7.59, p  = .007, 95% CI [10.86, 80.43], Ƞp2 = .04. No other effects were 
significant, Fs ≤ 1.84, ps ≥ .18, Ƞp2 < .04. Thus, our Leniency Hypothesis was supported 
in that participants were relatively unsure about whether the civilian was guilty of 
manslaughter or murder; their average verdict confidence was close to 0% (Figure 1). 
Yet, when the defendant was a veteran, they were significantly more confident in the 
more lenient verdict of manslaughter, which would carry with it a less serious 
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punishment—avoiding any possibility of life imprisonment. This pattern was similar for 
both men and women, and contradicts previous research that demonstrates protectors (vs. 
non-protectors) who commit harm are punished more severely because of the inherent 
betrayal of trust.  
Collective Guilt 
A second 2 x 2 (Defendant Veteran Status [veteran, civilian] x (Participant 
Gender [male, female]) between-subjects ANOVA revealed that, as predicted, when the 
defendant was a veteran, participants reported more collective guilt (M = 3.28, SD = 
1.52) compared to when the defendant was a civilian (M = 2.56, SD = 1.20), F(1, 170) = 
12.93, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.49, -.26], Ƞp2 = .07 (Table 1). No other effects were 
significant, Fs ≤ 0.30, ps ≥ .59, Ƞp2 < .002. This finding extends research demonstrating 
that people can experience collective guilt as a result of illegitimate in-group harm to out-
group members (Doosje et al., 1998; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006) to a situation in 
which the in-group has harmed in-group members. Participants in each condition read 
nearly identical versions of the defendant’s traumatic experience that led to their PTSD. 
The only notable difference in the vignettes was whether the defendant was described as 
a veteran who suffered trauma during combat or as a civilian who suffered trauma in a 
bank robbery. For this manipulation to have elicited collective guilt, participants must 
have acknowledged the illegitimate nature of the harm done, and accepted that their 
group (i.e., America) was at least partly responsible for that harm (Doosje et al., 1998; 
Wohl et al., 2006; Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010). Furthermore, these feelings of 
collective guilt occurred without prompting. The stimulus made no mention of America’s 
role in causing the veteran harm, yet participants reported significantly greater collective 
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guilt for the veteran’s (vs. civilian’s) trauma. Thus, although the civilian’s and veteran’s 
trauma were similar and the participant played no direct role in either scenario, 
participants implicated their own in-group as having some responsibility for the trauma 
suffered by the veteran.  
Proposed Mediation Model 
We tested the prediction that participants’ collective guilt mediated their leniency 
toward the veteran (vs. civilian) defendant with a moderated mediation model using 
Hayes’ PROCESS Macro (2013). Because men (vs. women) might more readily 
categorize the veteran defendant as belonging to a shared in-group, we tested whether the 
indirect effect of defendant veteran status on punitiveness through the potential mediator 
(i.e., collective guilt) was stronger for men than for women. 
As predicted, collective guilt mediated the leniency effect of the defendant’s 
veteran status on punitiveness for male participants, indirect effect = -10.87, 95% CIs = -
28.08, -2.70. Thus, reading about the veteran (vs. civilian) defendant increased male 
participants’ feelings of collective guilt, which subsequently reduced their punitiveness 
towards the defendant. In contrast, the indirect effect was not significant for women, 
indirect effect = -6.37, 95% CIs = -23.60, 1.24. Thus, although men and women reported 
similar levels of collective guilt and punitiveness overall (Table 1), collective guilt 
translated to more lenient punishment decisions only among men. Given that the military 
is a male-dominated institution (Patten & Parker, 2011), women might not as readily 
categorize the veteran as sharing an in-group, compared to men. If women do not 
spontaneously perceive the veteran to be an in-group member, they might be less 
motivated to compensate the veteran for the harm done. Men, on the other hand, readily 
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identifying the veteran as belonging to an in-group, believe the veteran is deserving of 
better treatment (Turner et al., 1987), motivating reparations in the form of more lenient 
judgments.  
Alternatively, social desirability effects might be driving women’s reported level 
of collective guilt. Men might be feeling genuine collective guilt due to a sense of shared 
group identity with war veterans, whereas women might be reporting more guilt than they 
are actually experiencing given that reporting guilt for suffering veterans’ plights is a 
highly socially desirable response. This could explain why men and women reported 
nearly identical levels of collective guilt for the veteran defendant’s suffering, but only 
men’s guilt mediated their leniency. Women’s artificially inflated guilt reports might not 
be infused into their verdict judgments because they are not actually feeling the emotion 
of guilt.          
 We designed Study 2 to address limitations of Study 1. In Study 1, we relied on 
self-reported collective guilt toward veterans, which is vulnerable to social desirability 
concerns. To address the possibility that men might be reporting genuine collective guilt 
that is translating to leniency, while women might be reporting collective guilt out of 
social desirability concerns and therefore not translating to leniency, we manipulated, 
rather than measured, guilt. We experimentally induced collective guilt to test its effects 
on punitiveness in Study 2 to avoid the self-reported nature of collective guilt in Study 1, 
but also to further establish this mechanism as a valid mediator of punitiveness (Spencer, 
Zanna, & Fong, 2006). Further, our explanation for Study 1 results rests on the 
assumption that gender moderates the collective guilt effect because men (vs. women) are 
more likely to classify the veteran as an in-group member. To provide converging 
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evidence and a conceptual replication in Study 2, we included an additional moderator 
that might predict the likelihood that participants classify the veteran as an in-group 
member and, therefore, should produce the same moderating effect: national 
identification as an American.  
Study 2 
In Study 2 we directly manipulated participants’ guilt toward veterans to test 
whether guilt reduces people’s punitiveness toward a veteran defendant who commits a 
crime. Additionally, we extended Study 1 to test whether this effect is limited to 
collective guilt or if it would extend to a personal guilt induction. Although guilt is often 
thought of as resulting from illegitimate action, guilt can also be the emotional 
consequence of one’s perceived inaction (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; 
Tilghman-Osborne, Cole, & Felton, 2010). Thus, people might experience (a) personal 
guilt as a result of not personally contributing to the war effort by serving, or not 
personally supporting veterans once they return home, and/or (b) collective guilt as a 
result of America failing to provide sufficient services to wounded veterans after they 
return home. We tested the effects of inducing personal guilt, collective guilt, or the 
combination (relative to a no-guilt control) on punitiveness. We predicted that the guilt 
inductions would decrease people’s punitiveness towards a veteran who commits a 
violent crime relative to a no-guilt control.  
Further, we predicted that these effects would be stronger for women than for 
men. In Study 1, men’s collective guilt predicted leniency even when we did not induce it 
by referring specifically to America’s responsibility for veterans’ suffering, which is 
analogous to the Study 2 no-guilt control condition. In contrast, collective guilt did not 
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predict leniency for women. Thus, we predicted that inducing guilt would have a more 
extreme effect on women than men because we expected men’s collective guilt toward 
veterans to consistently translate to greater leniency—even in the control condition that 
does not induce guilt. 
If gender moderated the link between collective guilt and leniency toward a war 
veteran because it is a proxy for the extent to which the participant identified with war 
veterans, we should see a similar pattern for other such proxies. Thus, we tested an 
additional moderator for our guilt inductions that, theoretically, should mirror our gender 
results: national identification as an American. Although high in-group identification has 
been found to predict reductions in feelings of collective guilt, these findings are all in the 
context of collective guilt for harm done to an out-group (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & 
Manstead, 1998, 2004, 2006). Our study, in contrast, focuses on collective guilt for harm 
done to an in-group member. Because harm to the self is perceived as particularly severe 
and illegitimate (Baumeister et al., 1990; Stillwell & Baumeister, 1997), high-identifiers 
might be more affected by knowledge of a harmed veteran than low-identifiers because 
they might more readily identify the veteran as an in-group member. Thus, similar to men 
(vs. women) who might identify more with the war veteran, we hypothesized that if 
participants identified strongly as Americans they would be lenient on the war veteran—
even without the guilt inductions. In contrast, similar to women, we hypothesized that if 
participants did not identify strongly as Americans the guilt inductions would have a 
stronger effect because, without the guilt inductions, they would be more punitive toward 
the veteran. In other words, we hypothesized that the guilt inductions would have a 
weaker effect as national identification increased. 
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Study 2 Method 
Participants 
A sample of (N = 610) participants was again recruited via M-Turk to complete 
the mock criminal trial online. Participants were excluded from analyses for failing 
attention checks (n = 23), being a veteran (n = 36), not being U.S. citizens (n = 8) or 
having a felony on their criminal record (n = 10). The final sample included 533 
participants (54% female; 78% White/Caucasian, 8% Black/African American, 7% 
Asian/Asian American, 5% Hispanic/Latino, and 2% Other; Mage = 34 years, SD = 12) 
were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: no-guilt control (n = 
133), personal guilt (n = 127), collective guilt (n = 132), or personal and collective guilt 
(n = 141) and were compensated $1.00 for their participation. 
Procedure 
All experimental procedures occurred online and were identical to that of Study 1 
with a few exceptions. First, before reading the Study 1 trial stimulus, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four guilt induction conditions. Second, we did not include 
the civilian defendant condition. 
Materials 
All materials were identical to Study 1 with two exceptions. First, identification as 
an American national was assessed with a scale slightly modified from previous research 
(Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006; see Appendix A). Participants were asked the extent to 
which they agreed with 8-items on 7-point response scales ranging from Strongly 
Disagree to Strongly Agree (e.g., “Being an American is an important part of my identity, 
“It is important to me to view myself as an American”, (α = .94). 
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Second, we added guilt induction stimuli that preceded the trial stimulus (see 
Appendix B). Each guilt condition began with the same cover story explaining that the 
study was being conducted in conjunction with a fictitious organization called the Center 
for Civilian and Veteran Issues and that they were first going to be presented with some 
information about the war and then asked questions about their attitudes.  Each condition 
began with innocuous facts about the war in Iraq that should not induce guilt (e.g., when 
it began, weapons used by the U.S., what divisions of the military were involved).  
Control condition. In the no-guilt condition, only the neutral information about 
the war was included. 
Individual guilt induction. The individual guilt stimulus indicated that many 
soldiers served, but had more men and women joined the war effort, the number of 
casualties would have been significantly reduced. Additionally, the individual guilt 
stimulus indicated that returning veterans believe more individuals should have 
volunteered to help them once they returned home, and that despite many individuals 
being in favor of going to war, there was little support from individuals once they 
returned. The goal of this information was to make participants feel personally guilty that 
they themselves did not serve in the war and had not helped returning veterans enough. 
To reinforce this manipulation, participants in this condition then answered five questions 
that were designed to elicit feelings of individual guilt. Participants responded 0 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 100 (Strongly Agree) to the following questions: “As an individual, I believe 
it is important that individuals fulfill their civil obligations”; “As an individual, I believe 
it is important to be indebted to those who fulfill their own civil duties”; and “As an 
individual, I believe it is important to provide adequate support to those who serve their 
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country”.  Participants then responded Yes or No to the following two questions: “Have 
you, or do you currently, serve in the military?”; and “If not, do you personally believe 
you should have?” We were not interested in the responses to these questions as 
dependent measures, but included them only to induce more intense feelings of personal 
guilt. These questions asked participants to respond as an individual in order to have 
participants think of their failure to act in terms of their personal (rather than collective) 
identity (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994).  
Collective guilt induction. The collective guilt stimulus indicated that many 
returning veterans struggle with war related issues, disabilities, and many are homeless or 
on the verge of homelessness because America has failed to provide adequate care and 
resources. The collective guilt stimulus then indicates that veterans reportedly feel 
America as a society has failed to properly care for those who defended their freedom, 
despite America’s overwhelming support for the war initially. The goal of this 
information was to make participants feel collective guilt as members of America, who 
have let down veterans who are struggling and suffering after returning from war. To 
reinforce this manipulation, participants in this condition then answered five questions 
that were designed to elicit feelings of collective guilt. Participants responded 0 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 100 (Strongly Agree) to the following questions: “As an American, I believe 
it is important that America fulfills its civil obligations to its soldiers”, “As an American, 
I believe it is important to be indebted to soldiers who perform their civil duties”, and 
“As an American, I believe it is important to provide adequate support to those who serve 
their country”.  Participants then responded Yes or No to the following two questions: 
“Do you believe America has done enough to support veterans returning from war?”; and 
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“If not, as an American, do you feel like America should?” Again, we were not interested 
in the responses to these questions as dependent measures, but included them only to 
induce more intense feelings of collective guilt. These questions asked participants to 
respond thinking of themselves as an American, to have participants think of America’s 
failure to act in terms of their collective (rather than personal) identity (Turner, Oakes, 
Haslam, & McGarty, 1994; Sullivan et al., 2013). 
Individual & collective guilt induction. The individual and collective guilt 
stimulus combined the information and the questions from the individual and collective 
guilt conditions.  
Study 2 Results and Discussion 
Guilt Inductions Moderated by Gender 
To test the hypothesis that participants induced to feel personal and/or collective 
guilt would report less punitive judgments compared to participants who were not 
induced to feel guilt, we conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 (Individual Guilt [individual guilt, no 
individual guilt] x (Collective Guilt [collective guilt, no collective guilt] x (Participant 
Gender [male, female]) between-subjects ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant 
three-way Individual Guilt x Collective Guilt x Participant Gender interaction. F(1, 525) 
= 4.05, p = .045, 95% CI [.48, 73.92], Ƞp2 = .01. No other effects were significant Fs ≤ 
.49, ps ≥ .48, Ƞp2 < .001. In order to follow up the significant three-way interaction, the 
simple 2 x 2 (Individual Guilt [individual guilt, no individual guilt] x (Collective Guilt 
[collective guilt, no collective guilt]) interaction was tested separately for men and 
women. These analyses revealed a significant two-way interaction between individual 
20 
and collective guilt for women, F(1, 525) = 3.96, p = .05. The two-way interaction was 
not significant for men, F(1, 525) = 0.80, p = .372.  
Planned contrasts compared women in each guilt induction condition to the 
women in the control group. As predicted, women induced to feel individual guilt (M = -
32.72, SD = 80.80) gave significantly less punitive judgments compared to women in the 
control group (M = -10.97, SD = 80.8), F(1, 525) = 2.7, p = .05 (one-tailed, Figure 2). 
Furthermore, women induced to feel collective guilt (M = -31.96, SD = 75.96) gave 
significantly less punitive judgments compared to women in the control group, F(1, 525) 
= 2.68, p = .05 (one-tailed). Thus, as predicted, the women induced to feel personal or 
collective guilt rendered less punitive judgments of the veteran defendant compared to 
women who did not receive a guilt induction. Interestingly, hearing both the individual 
and collective guilt induction did not make people more lenient—this condition did not 
differ significantly from control, F(1, 525) = .18, p = 67.  
Thus, inducing women to feel both personal guilt and collective guilt lead to less 
punitive judgments for a veteran defendant. Yet, as predicted, men who received the guilt 
inductions did not render significantly less punitive judgments of the veteran defendant 
compared to men who did not receive a guilt induction. Given that men (vs. women) are 
more likely to identify with veterans and classify them as an in-group member, we did 
not have to induce guilt for men to offer reparations (i.e., leniency) — Men were 
similarly lenient towards the veteran defendant regardless of whether they read a guilt 
induction or not (Table 2), as there was no significant interaction, F(1, 525) = .83, p  = 
.36, and no significant main effects, Fs < .34, ps > .56 . This finding suggests that the 
guilt inductions were not effective in producing leniency effects over and above the 
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naturally occurring leniency found among men in Study 1 and among men assigned to the 
no-guilt control condition in Study 2.  
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Guilt Inductions Moderated by National Identification 
To test the hypothesis that guilt inductions would elicit less punitive judgments 
and that this effect would weaken as national identification increased we conducted a 
linear regression that included dummy codes for the individual guilt induction, the 
collective guilt induction, and participants’ centered national identification scores in Step 
1, all two-way interaction terms in Step 2, and the three-way interaction term in Step 3 as 
predictors of punitiveness. Step 1 (i.e., the main-effects-only model) of the regression 
revealed that identifying more strongly as an American was associated with more lenient 
verdicts, B = -5.48, SE = 2.30, p = .02, CI [-9.99, -.96]. The main effect of the individual 
guilt induction, B = -1.52, SE = 6.79, p = .82, CI [-14.86, 11.82], and collective guilt 
induction, B = -5.34, SE = 6.79, p = .43, CI [-18.74, 7.95], were not significant. Step 2 of 
the regression revealed that the individual guilt manipulation, B = 10.17, SE = 4.59, p = 
.03, CI [1.15, 19.19], and collective guilt manipulation (marginally), B = 8.32, SE = 4.60, 
p = .07, CI [-.72, 17.36], depended on the participants’ level of national identification. 
The interaction between the individual and collective guilt manipulations were not 
significant, B = 10.11, SE = 13.56, p = .45, CI [-16.52, 36.75]. Finally, the three-way 
interaction was not significant in Step 3, B = 2.35, SE = 9.21, p = .80, CI [-15.75, 20.45]. 
To probe the significant and marginal two-way interactions, we applied the 
Johnson-Neyman technique (Hayes & Matthew, 2009). Rather than selecting two 
arbitrary values of the moderator at which to assess the significance of the focal predictor 
(e.g., 1 SD above and below the mean; cf. Aiken & West, 1991), the Johnson-Neyman 
approach identifies the entire range of moderator values in which the focal predictor is 
significant. Thus, this approach provides a more complete picture of moderation patterns 
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than traditional methods. Specifically, we utilized this technique to test our hypothesis 
that the strength of our individual guilt induction and collective guilt induction would 
weaken as national identification increases (Table 3).  
The strength of the individual guilt induction effect indeed decreased as national 
identification increased. The individual guilt induction significantly reduced punitiveness 
toward the veteran if the participants had a national identification scale score at or below 
2.80. We found a similar pattern for the collective guilt induction, such that the strength 
of the effect also decreased as national identification increased. The collective guilt 
induction significantly reduced punitiveness toward the veteran if the participants had a 
national identification scale score at or below 2.80. Thus, if you were above the midpoint 
of the national identification scale, neither of the guilt inductions had a significant effect 
on your judgments. We graphed the interaction based on traditional approaches (+/- 1 
SD) to provide a visual depiction of the pattern of the interaction, which demonstrates 
that the collective guilt (Figure 3) and individual guilt (Figure 4) inductions are less 
effective on those with higher national identification because, as hypothesized, they were 
similarly lenient across the guilt conditions—even when not induced to feel guilty. 
In summary, we found that the guilt inductions interacted similarly with two very 
different variables that might make participants more likely to classify the veteran as an 
in-group member: gender and national identification as an American. We found that guilt 
inductions led to greater leniency toward a veteran who committed a crime, but only for 
those who are relatively less likely to classify the veteran as an in-group member (i.e., 
women, people who score low on national identification as an American). In contrast, 
these manipulations were less effective for those who are more likely to classify the 
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veteran as an in-group members (i.e., men, people who score high on national 
identification as an American) because they are already more lenient without the guilt 
inductions.   
General Discussion 
 The existing literature on protectors who violate our trust demonstrates a trust-
betrayal punitiveness effect: protectors are punished more punitively than non-protectors 
because of the trust violation inherent in the protector’s crime (Koehler & Gershoff, 
2003). Yet, we demonstrated that when the protector incurred harm in the line of duty, 
the trust-betrayal punitiveness effect was not only eliminated, but reversed: people were 
more lenient on a veteran (vs. a civilian) with PTSD for committing a violent crime. For 
men, who are more likely to classify the veteran as an in-group member, this leniency 
was explained by collective guilt for the veteran’s war related suffering (Study 1). In 
Study 2, people who are less likely to spontaneously classify the veteran as an in-group 
member (i.e., women, people who do not identify strongly with America), were more 
lenient towards the veteran transgressor when experimentally induced to feel collective or 
personal guilt for the veterans suffering. Conversely, for those who are more likely to 
spontaneously classify the veteran as an in-group member (i.e., men, people who identify 
strongly with America), the personal and collective guilt inductions did not have an effect 
because they were lenient towards the veteran without any guilt induction.  
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Theoretical Implications  
The current studies have several important theoretical implications for social 
psychology. First, these studies reveal a boundary condition that reverses previous 
findings that demonstrate greater punitiveness toward protectors (vs. non-protectors; 
Koehler & Gershoff, 2003) and high-status (vs. low-status; Fragale, Rosen, Xu, & 
Merideth, 2009) perpetrators. Specifically, this effect reverses when protectors have been 
harmed while serving their protective role and we identified collective guilt for that harm 
as a psychological explanation.  
Second, this research addresses an acknowledged gap in the collective guilt 
literature (Sullivan et al., 2013) by demonstrating that people are motivated to make 
reparations by collective guilt for their in-group’s harming of its own members. Further, 
although collective guilt is considered a relatively rare phenomenon because people avoid 
thinking of their in-group negatively by minimizing and justifying the harm it causes 
(Branscombe, 2004; Wolh, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006), our data suggest that collective 
guilt toward one’s own in-group might be more difficult to avoid. That is, for some 
participants (i.e., men in Study 1; men and those who identify strongly with America, 
Study 2), collective guilt explained leniency towards the veteran even when there was no 
explicit indication of the in-group’s responsibility for the harm done. People might be 
less able to exonerate their in-group from wrongdoing when the victims are in-group 
members.  
 Third, the effect of collective guilt on reparations (i.e., leniency in punishment) 
was dependent on participant characteristics that serve as proxies for the likelihood of 
classifying the harmed perpetrator as an in-group member. Although gender and national 
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identification are very different individual difference variables, they are both relevant to 
the likelihood of the veteran being classified as an in-group member, and, as a result, both 
similarly moderated the effect of collective guilt on leniency. In other words, these two 
moderation effects served as conceptual replications of the hypothesis that the effect of 
collective guilt on leniency would depend on the extent to which people are likely to 
classify the transgressor as an in-group member. The moderating effect of gender 
supports (unpublished) previous research demonstrating that collective guilt is more 
likely to be experienced when a harmed individual is more easily categorized as 
belonging to the in-group (Branscombe, 2003 as cited in Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 
2006). Further, the moderating effect of national identification qualifies existing literature 
demonstrating that high-identifiers are less likely to experience collective guilt or make 
reparations compared to low-identifiers, because high-identifiers are motivated to 
maintain a positive in-group image and ignore threatening information (Doosje et al., 
1998, 2004, 2006). In Study 2, high identifiers (vs. low identifiers) were more lenient 
towards the veteran, making the guilt induction manipulations less effective for these 
participants. We believe that the discrepancy with previous research is due to the fact that 
we measured and manipulated collective guilt towards harmed in-group members, rather 
than harmed out-group members—the latter being the case in all previous collective guilt 
research. Because harm to the self is perceived as more severe and less legitimate than 
harm to others (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Stillwell & Baumeister, 1997), 
high-identifiers might be less able to exonerate in-group transgressions when the person 
being harmed is another in-group (vs. out-group) member, and as a result, are more 
motivated to make reparations. In other words, when an in-group member is harmed, this 
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might trump high identifiers’ motivation to maintain a positive group image, undermining 
the exonerating strategies high-identifiers typically employ when made aware of their in-
group harming an out-group. 
Finally, we empirically demonstrated that the personal and collective guilt 
inductions were effective in isolation, but became ineffective when combined. 
Participants in the combined guilt condition reported the lowest level of guilt of all four 
conditions, and their level of punitiveness was nearly identical to that of no-guilt control 
participants. This finding is consistent with psychologists who have theorized that a 
diffusion of accountability might be possible if people experience personal and collective 
guilt at the same time (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). People might 
accept that they are personally accountable, but knowledge that the rest of the group is 
also responsible might reduce one’s overall experience of guilt, and in turn, the 
motivation to compensate the harmed individuals.  
Legal Implications 
The current studies also offer both theoretical implications for psychology and 
law and practical implications for the legal system. We not only identified an extralegal 
variable that might affect sentencing (i.e., veteran status) but also identified the 
psychological mechanism underlying this effect (i.e., collective guilt toward veteran’s 
suffering). This finding identifies a new role that emotion might play in legal 
proceedings: collective guilt can produce leniency in the punishment of violent crimes. 
Generally speaking, defendants who elicit feelings of collective guilt might be given 
more lenient punishments. PTSD is typically an ineffective defense for sufferers other 
than veterans or battered women (Grey, 2012). Traumatic life histories offered as 
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mitigating evidence, such as difficult childhoods, can even backfire and lead to more 
punitive sentences (Barnett, Brodsky, & Price, 2007; Stevenson, Bottoms, & Diamond, 
2010). The current findings suggest, however, that these legal strategies might be more 
effective if they are presented in a manner that elicits collective guilt in the decision 
maker (e.g., highlight that society failed to protect the defendant as a child).  
These findings are particularly important given how often PTSD is likely to be 
employed as a legal defense for a wounded veteran. Prevalence estimates of PTSD in 
veterans returning from the recent war in Iraq range from 20% to nearly 40% (Litz & 
Schlenger, 2009; PEW Research Center, 2011)—much higher than the rate of PTSD in 
the general population (8%, Thomas et al., 2010). Criminal behavior rates of Iraq 
veterans with PTSD are unknown. Based on previous wars, 25% of these wounded 
veterans are estimated to engage in criminal behavior after returning home (Gover, 2008). 
Our findings empirically support speculation that PTSD might be a particularly effective 
defense for veterans (Higgins, 1991). The perception that PTSD is an appeal to patriotism 
(Slovenko, 2004) is indirectly supported by our findings that the PTSD defense for a 
veteran is emotionally evocative, eliciting collective guilt in jurors and motivating 
leniency in their judgments. The current studies identified an extralegal variable that 
attorneys and the legal system should be made aware of: PTSD defenses will be more 
effective if judges and juries feel collective guilt for the defendant’s suffering, as was the 
case for a veteran defendant. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Limitations inherent in the scope of the present research raise several novel 
theoretical questions and fruitful avenues for future research. First, it is unclear whether 
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the leniency effect found in Study 1 and Study 2 will generalize to other types of 
protectors who incur harm.  For example, people might not experience guilt for the harm 
a police officer incurred in the line of duty. Second, future research could investigate 
whether the trust-betrayal punitiveness found in past research is limited to crimes that 
occur while a protector is currently performing their protective duties, given that our 
study involved a protector who committed a crime subsequent to their protective duties. 
Third, it is unclear whether being a veteran and having risked one’s life is sufficient to 
elicit collective guilt and leniency, or whether being harmed in the line of duty is a 
necessary condition for these effects to emerge. Fourth, PTSD might uniquely produce 
leniency for a wounded veteran because of behavioral consequences associated with the 
disorder, such as heightened anger and aggression (Friel, White, & Hull, (2008), which 
might provide a valid excuse for the crime committed. It is thus possible that other types 
of harm, such as a physical disability, might not produce the same kind of leniency 
towards a veteran who commits a crime.  
Additionally, future research should further investigate why inducing collective 
and individual guilt at the same time decreases compensatory behaviors relative to 
inducing only one or the other. It is possible that people feel less guilt because adding 
personal on top of collective diffuses feelings of guilt overall (Doosje et al., 1998). This 
finding might also represent diminishing returns on guilt—perhaps both inductions were 
too much guilt for participants to address and therefore led to a rejection of the guilt 
inductions. That is, accepting they are personally guilty, but also collectively guilty, 
might be too great a threat to participants’ personal and collective self-esteem, which 
might result in them simply refusing to accept they are guilty at either level. The current 
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studies were not designed to assess participants’ use of exonerating cognitions; future 
research could attempt to clarify the exonerating processes that lead to these reduced guilt 
effects.  
Finally, although the pattern of leniency replicated between the two experiments 
presented here, our study is vulnerable to typical criticisms of mock jury studies, 
including a lack of jury deliberation and ecologically valid trial stimuli (e.g., Diamond, 
1997). Although research has revealed little difference between mock jurors’ decisions in 
reaction to written scenarios versus more elaborate videotaped testimony (Bornstein, 
1999) and there are many instances of deliberation exerting minimal effect on judgments 
(Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; but see Salerno & Diamond, 2010), future research could 
investigate whether these effects generalize to more ecologically valid studies.  
Conclusions 
Protectors who incur harm in the line of duty might be treated with more leniency 
than non-protectors for the same crime. Even when people bear no responsibility for the 
harm the protector incurred, they can feel collective guilt for that harm, which motivates 
them to make reparations in the form of lenient punishment. This phenomenon is 
dependent on the extent to which people are likely to classify the protector as an in-group 
member—even when there is no explicit attention drawn to the in-group’s responsibility 
for the harm done to the protector. Finally, we demonstrated one way in which this 
psychological phenomenon might manifest in legal judgments with serious 
consequences: Americans’ collective guilt toward veterans’ suffering translating to more 
lenient sentences when a veteran subsequently commits a violent crime. 
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Footnotes 
1The collective guilt questions were mistakenly preceded by the statement “Please 
answer the following questions concerning how you, as an individual, feel about one’s 
own responsibility in fulfilling their civil obligations." This could raise the concern that 
this sentence might have induced individual guilt and therefore explain the leniency we 
see in this collective guilt condition. We do not believe this to be the case for several 
reasons. First, given that participants in this condition read a lengthy passage inducing 
collective guilt and that they were actually asked questions about themselves at the group 
level (i.e., “as an American”) it is unlikely that this short statement induced individual 
guilt effectively. Second, if this statement had actually induced individual guilt 
effectively then this condition would represent both an individual and collective guilt 
induction and should have had a similar effect as the combined individual and collective 
guilt condition in the design. This was not the case, however, as the collective guilt 
condition exhibited significantly greater leniency than control, whereas the combined 
condition did not. 
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Opening Statements 
In their opening statement, the prosecution stated that they would show that the defendant 
admitted to beating the victim, thereby causing the victim's death. They also stated that 
they would demonstrate that he did so knowingly and that his actions were unreasonable 
given the victim's actions. They argued that these facts would be demonstrated and 
support the more serious charge of murder in the second degree.  In their opening 
statement, the defense stated that they would demonstrate that a traumatic event in the 
defendant's history led the defendant to react to the victim's actions in a heat of passion. 
They also stated they would demonstrate that, given the defendant's history, the 
defendant's reaction to the victim's provocation was reasonable. They argued that these 
facts would be demonstrated and support the less serious charge of manslaughter.     
Prosecution’s Case 
The prosecution’s case included evidence from the defendant, police reports, eye witness 
testimony, etc. that described the incident in question. The prosecution is calling for a 
verdict of murder in the second degree, given that the defendant willfully beat the victim 
to death, not in the heat of passion, but with full awareness of the consequences of their 
actions. On a Saturday evening, the defendant went to the local shopping mall to run 
some errands.  After approximately one hour of shopping, the defendant exited the 
mall.   While walking in the parking lot, the defendant and victim accidentally bumped 
into each other. Following the initial contact, witnesses claim that the victim uttered a 
profane insult toward the defendant in an aggressive manner. The defendant took great 
offense to this, and proceeded to verbally assault the victim, shouting multiple 
expletives.  After shouting at one another in an increasingly hostile fashion, the defendant 
shoved the victim. The victim shoved the defendant back. After a few moments, the 
shoving escalated into physical violence. The defendant punched the victim in the face 
and body. Although the victim tried to defend himself, witnesses report the defendant 
quickly had the upper hand. The victim became bloodied and staggered. The defendant 
tossed the victim onto the ground and continued to assault the victim. The punches to the 
face of the defendant continued mercilessly. Mall security arrived and intervened, pulling 
the defendant off of the victim.  Emergency services were called and arrived a short while 
later. The defendant had minor injuries as a result of the conflict.  Paramedics report the 
victim was unconscious with lacerations to the face and weak vital signs. The defendant 
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was taken into custody. The victim ultimately died from injuries sustained during the 
fight.   
Defense’s Case (Veteran Condition) 
The defense’s case included evidence from the defendant, eye witness testimony, etc. that 
described a series of events previously experienced by the defendant. The defense is 
calling for a less serious verdict of manslaughter, given that the defendant reacted to the 
victim's provocation in the heat of passion, as a result of his past history. Defense 
witnesses described a series of events previously experienced by the defendant.  The 
defendant and a close friend were on patrol in a relatively safe area in Helmand Province, 
Afghanistan. Following a brief patrol, the two approached a checkpoint. As they 
approached, four men in masks burst from a nearby vehicle. The masked men began 
shouting and making demands. As a member of the Afghan Army attempted to intervene, 
the masked men opened fire. Most people nearby dove for cover, several were paralyzed 
with fear. The defendant and friend sought cover behind a nearby shack. The masked 
men soon targeted the shack that the defendant and friend were seeking cover behind. 
The masked men opened fire and both were wounded from the gunfire. The defendant 
was struck in the shoulder and the leg. The friend of the defendant was struck in the 
chest. The masked men continued firing at the Afghan Military and civilians. The masked 
men fell back to their vehicle and continued to fire as they retreated, striking several other 
people. The ground was covered with the blood of the dead and wounded. The defendant 
attempted to give aid to the friend despite being wounded himself. Before the 
reinforcements arrived on scene both men lost consciousness. The defendant awoke in 
the hospital and discovered that his efforts to save his friend were unsuccessful. The 
defendant’s friend was pronounced dead at the hospital along with seven others. 
Additional testimony revealed that shortly after this traumatic event the defendant began 
suffering from several impairments. The defendant has continuous problems with sleep 
disturbances, and is often quick to anger. The defendant has continuous thoughts about 
the event despite his attempts to avoid them, and no longer spends time with anyone who 
is associated with the event. The defendant no longer enjoys many of the activities he 
once did, is easily startled, and is constantly on alert. The defendant feels at fault for the 
death of a friend and reports a persistent negative emotional state. Based on these 
symptoms, the defendant was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) by 
a licensed Psychotherapist. The defense argued that this traumatic event has caused great 
distress in the defendant’s life.  This past event ultimately contributed to the outcome of 
40 
his altercation with the victim by rendering the defendant less able to control himself 
when provoked. 
Defense’s Case (Civilian Condition) 
The defense’s case included evidence from the defendant, eye witness testimony, etc. that 
described a series of events previously experienced by the defendant. The defense is 
calling for a less serious verdict of manslaughter, given that the defendant reacted to the 
victim’s provocation in the heat of passion, as a result of his past history. Defense 
witnesses described a series of events previously experienced by the defendant.  The 
defendant and a close friend entered a bank to deposit a check. Following a brief wait in 
line, the two approached the counter. As they approached, four men in masks burst 
through the door of the bank. The masked men began shouting and demanding money. 
As a security guard attempted to intervene, the masked men opened fire. Most people 
dove for cover, several were paralyzed with fear. The defendant and friend sought cover 
behind a nearby desk. The masked men soon targeted the desk that the defendant and 
friend were seeking cover behind. The masked men opened fire and both were wounded 
from the gunfire. The defendant was struck in the shoulder and the leg. The friend of the 
defendant was struck in the chest. The masked men continued firing at the customers and 
staff. The robbers jumped the counter, took then money and continued to fire as they 
exited the bank, striking several other people. The floor was covered with the blood of 
the dead and wounded. The defendant attempted to give aid to the friend despite being 
wounded himself. Before the paramedics arrived on scene both men lost consciousness. 
The defendant awoke in the hospital and discovered that his efforts to save his friend 
were unsuccessful. The defendant’s friend was pronounced dead at the hospital along 
with seven others. Additional testimony revealed that shortly after this traumatic event 
the defendant began suffering from several impairments. The defendant has continuous 
problems with sleep disturbances, and is often quick to anger. The defendant has 
continuous thoughts about the event despite his attempts to avoid them, and no longer 
spends time with anyone who is associated with the event. The defendant no longer 
enjoys many of the activities he once did, is easily startled, and is constantly on alert. The 
defendant feels at fault for the death of a friend and reports a persistent negative 
emotional state. Based on these symptoms, the defendant was diagnosed with Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) by a licensed Psychotherapist. The defense argued that 
this traumatic event has caused great distress in the defendant’s life. This past event 
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ultimately contributed to the outcome of his altercation with the victim by rendering the 
defendant less able to control himself when provoked. 
Closing Arguments 
The prosecution argued that their evidence and witnesses demonstrate that the defendant 
knowingly and purposely killed the victim and is guilty of murder in the second degree. 
There was no reasonable provocation to justify the killing, and the defendant deserves to 
be found guilty of the more serious charge of 2nd degree murder, and the more severe 
sentence that comes along with that charge. The defense argued that their evidence and 
witnesses demonstrate that the defendant was provoked by the victim, and that the 
traumatic experience in his past caused him to react in the heat of passion. They argued 
that his reaction to the provocation was reasonable, given his past, and the defendant 
deserves to be found guilty of the less serious charge of manslaughter, and the less severe 
sentence that comes along with that charge. 
Jury Instructions 
Please read the following instructions carefully and use them in your decision making. 
The fact that an unlawful killing took place is not in question. Your decision is whether 
the facts of the crime constitute murder in the second degree or manslaughter.         
MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE   
A person is guilty of murder if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he:                
(1) caused the victim’s death or serious bodily injury that then resulted in death; 
and                  
(2) the defendant did so purposely or knowingly; and                  
(3) the defendant did not act in a Heat of Passion resulting from a reasonable 
provocation.         
VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER   
A person is guilty of manslaughter if you believe that the defendant acted in a Heat of 
Passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.  The defendant (not the prosecution) 
must show, to a preponderance of the evidence, that he committed the crime while he was 
in a Heat of Passion.   
"Preponderance of the evidence" means evidence favors one side more than the other. If 
you believe that the evidence more likely than not supports the defendant’s claim that he 
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acted in a heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation, then you must render a 
verdict of manslaughter."     
 “Reasonable provocation” means that the provocation was sufficient to arouse the heat 
of passion for an ordinary, reasonable person such that he or she could have lost self-
control under the circumstances in this case. 
 
Would you sentence the defendant to Murder in the Second Degree or Voluntary 
Manslaughter 
 Murder in the Second Degree  
 Voluntary Manslaughter  
 
How confident are you in your verdict? 
 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree to the following statements.   
As an American I feel guilt about the traumatic events the defendant experienced. 
 
As an American I feel somewhat responsible for the traumatic events the defendant experienced. 
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As an American I feel guilty about the negative things the defendant has experienced since the 
traumatic event. 
 
 
As an American I feel that I should find a way to compensate the defendant for the traumatic 
events he experienced. 
 
As an American I feel that society should find a way to compensate the defendant for the 
traumatic events he experienced. 
 
As an American I feel that the universe should find a way to compensate the defendant for the 
traumatic events he experienced. 
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This question is designed to make sure survey respondents are paying attention. Please choose 
"somewhat agree" to answer this question. 
 Strongly Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  
 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Agree  
 Strongly Agree  
 
Gender 
 Male  
 Female  
 Other:  ____________________ 
 
How old are you (in years)? 
 
Ethnicity/Race 
 White / Caucasian (1) 
 Hispanic / Latino (2) 
 Black / African American (3) 
 Native American / American Indian (4) 
 Asian / Asian American (5) 
 Hawaiian / Pacific Islander (6) 
 Other (7) ____________________ 
 
What is your veteran status? 
 Veteran (1) 
 Not a Veteran (2) 
 
Have you ever been convicted of a felony? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
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National Identification Scale (Study 2 only) 
I love America. 
 
Being an American is an important part of my identity. 
 
It is important to me to contribute to my nation.  
 
 
It is important to me to view myself as an American. 
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I am strongly committed to my nation. 
 
It is important to me that everyone will see me as an American.  
 
It is important to me to serve my country.  
 
When I talk about Americans I usually say we rather than they. 
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NO GUILT INDUCTION (CONTROL) CONDITION 
In cooperation with the Center for Civilian and Veteran Issues, we have agreed to ask participants 
to read information and answer some questions about their attitudes. Please read the following 
information and answer the questions. Operation Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003. By May 
President Bush had declared major combat operations over. However this was certainly by no 
means the end. In December 2003 Saddam Hussein was captured during operation Red Dawn. 
Four months later in April the first battle of Falujah began. It was realized here that the major 
opposition was no longer forces loyal to Saddam but instead insurgents. The war continued for 6 
more years. By early 2009 troop levels began to be reduced as more were sent home. By mid 
2010 all combat troops had left Iraq. During operation Iraqi Freedom the troops were equipped 
with standard issue rifles. These firearms included the m4 carbine, m16, m14 and FN SCAR. The 
M4 and the M16 use NATO 5.56x45mm round. While the SCAR and M14 use the 7.62x51mm. 
The forces involved in the invasion and occupation of Iraq came from all branches of the military. 
The Army made up the majority of the total troops deployed to Iraq at approximately 54%, next 
Navy at 17%, then Air Force at 14% and finally Marines at 13%. 
INDIVIDUAL GUILT INDUCTION CONDITION 
In cooperation with the Center for Civilian and Veteran Issues, we have agreed to ask participants 
to read information and answer some questions about their attitudes. Please read the following 
information and answer the questions. Operation Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003. By May 
President Bush had declared major combat operations over. However this was certainly by no 
means the end. In December 2003 Saddam Hussein was captured during operation Red Dawn. 
Four months later in April the first battle of Falujah began. It was realized here that the major 
opposition was no longer forces loyal to Saddam but instead insurgents. The war continued for 6 
more years. By early 2009 troop levels began to be reduced as more were sent home. By mid 
2010 all combat troops had left Iraq. During operation Iraqi Freedom the troops were equipped 
with standard issue rifles. These firearms included the m4 carbine, m16, m14 and FN SCAR. The 
M4 and the M16 use NATO 5.56x45mm round. While the SCAR and M14 use the 7.62x51mm. 
The forces involved in the invasion and occupation of Iraq came from all branches of the military. 
The Army made up the majority of the total troops deployed to Iraq at approximately 54%, next 
Navy at 17%, then Air Force at 14% and finally Marines at 13%. 
Although many brave soldiers served, we needed not only many more men, but also many more 
women to step up and fight for their country in order to be successful. Post-war reports suggest 
that had more men and women actually joined the war effort, the number of casualties would 
have been significantly reduced.  For example, with more individual men and women on the 
ground the chance of being outnumbered in certain battles would have been reduced and troops 
requiring reinforcement would have received assistance much more quickly. As of 2010, nearly 
all troops have returned from Iraq.  Reports indicate a shortage of volunteers at home to assist 
with supporting the returning veterans.  According to survey data, returning veterans believe that 
more individuals should have volunteered to help them after they returned from war. 
Additionally, they report feeling disappointed that despite all of the individuals who were in favor 
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of the war effort, they have little support from individuals when they return home. Please answer 
the following questions concerning how you, as an individual, feel about one’s own responsibility 
in fulfilling their civil obligations.      
 
 As an Individual, I believe it is important that Individuals fulfill their civil obligations. 
 
As an Individual, I believe it is important to be indebted to those who fulfill their own civil duties. 
 
As an Individual, I believe it is important to provide adequate support to those who serve their 
country.  
 
 
Have you, or do you currently, serve in the military?        
 Yes  
 No  
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If not, do you personally believe you should have?       
 Yes  
 No  
COLLECTIVE GUILT INDUCTION CONDITION 
In cooperation with the Center for Civilian and Veteran Issues, we have agreed to ask participants 
to read information and answer some questions about their attitudes. Please read the following 
information and answer the questions. Operation Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003. By May 
President Bush had declared major combat operations over. However this was certainly by no 
means the end. In December 2003 Saddam Hussein was captured during operation Red Dawn. 
Four months later in April the first battle of Falujah began. It was realized here that the major 
opposition was no longer forces loyal to Saddam but instead insurgents. The war continued for 6 
more years. By early 2009 troop levels began to be reduced as more were sent home. By mid 
2010 all combat troops had left Iraq. During operation Iraqi Freedom the troops were equipped 
with standard issue rifles. These firearms included the m4 carbine, m16, m14 and FN SCAR. The 
M4 and the M16 use NATO 5.56x45mm round. While the SCAR and M14 use the 
7.62x51mm.The forces involved in the invasion and occupation of Iraq came from all branches of 
the military. The Army made up the majority of the total troops deployed to Iraq at approximately 
54%, next Navy at 17%, then Air Force at 14% and finally Marines at 13%. 
According to the Center for Civilian and Veteran Issues a considerable proportion of returning 
veterans struggle with war related mental problems and disabilities, and many are homeless or on 
the verge of homelessness.  Post-war reports suggest that America has failed to provide adequate 
services to returning veterans. Survey data indicate Veterans feel that they do not have access to 
mental health and other essential services that they need to deal with the trauma they experienced 
when fighting for our country. The majority of veterans feel that America, as a society, has failed 
to properly care for veterans who stepped up and defended America’s freedom---despite 
America’s overwhelming support for the war initially and America’s willingness to send the 
soldiers into a situation that America knew would be dangerous, traumatic, and likely to cause the 
post-war difficulties that they are currently experiencing. Please answer the following questions 
concerning how you, as an individual, feel about one’s own responsibility in fulfilling their civil 
obligations.     
 
  As an American, I believe it is important that America fulfills its civil obligations to its soldiers. 
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As an American, I believe it is important to be indebted to soldiers who perform their civil duties. 
 
As an American, I believe it is important to provide adequate support for those who serve their 
country.  
 
Do you believe America has done enough to support veterans returning from war? 
 Yes  
 No  
 
If not, as an American, do you feel like America should?  
 Yes  
 No  
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Table 1.   
Study 1 Means and Standard Deviations of Collective Guilt and Punitiveness 
 Men Women 
 Veteran  
M  
(SD) 
Civilian  
M  
(SD) 
Veteran 
M  
(SD) 
Civilian 
M  
(SD) 
     
Collective Guilt 3.28 
(1.37) 
2.63 
(1.18) 
3.28 
(1.69) 
2.42 
(1.24) 
     
Punitiveness -33.52 
(75.42) 
-19.65 
(77.45) 
-30.48 
(78.08) 
10.82 
(82.98) 
 
Note. Higher values indicate more reported collective guilt, and more punitive verdicts.  
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Table 2.   
Study 2 Means and Standard Deviations of Punitiveness 
Participant 
Gender 
Guilt Condition Punitiveness  
M (SD) 
Men   
 Control (n = 64) -29.04 (77.94) 
  
Individual Guilt (n = 63) 
-17.92 (80.10) 
  
Collective (n = 60) 
-25.82 (77.43) 
  
Individual and Collective (n = 71) 
-32.68 (74.34) 
 
Women 
  
 Control (n = 79) -10.98 (80.80) 
  
Individual (n = 64) 
-32.72 (80.82) 
  
Collective (n = 72) 
-31.96 (75.96) 
  
Individual and Collective (n = 70) 
-16.50 (81.97) 
Note. Higher values indicate more reported collective guilt, and more punitive verdicts. 
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55 
Note. To probe the guilt inductions by national identification interactions, we utilized 
Hayes and Matthes’ MODPROBE SPSS macro, which incorporates the Johnson-Neyman 
technique. This analysis reveals all ranges of the moderator (e.g., national identification) 
in which the focal predictor (i.e., individual guilt induction, collective guilt induction) is a 
significant or non-significant predictor of the outcome (i.e., punitiveness). Gray bars 
indicate the point at (or below) which the conditional effect is a significant predictor of 
punitiveness. 
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Figure 1. Punitiveness as a function of defendant veteran status. Punitiveness ranged from 100% 
confident the defendant is guilty of manslaughter (-100) to 100% confident the defendant is 
guilty of second degree murder (+100).  
* p < .01. 
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Figure 2. Women’s punitiveness toward a veteran defendant as a function of guilt induction 
condition in Study 2.  Punitiveness ranged from 100% confident the defendant is guilty of 
manslaughter (-100) to 100% confident the defendant is guilty of second degree murder (+100). 
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Figure 3.The effect of collective guilt predicting punitiveness as a function of national 
identification. Punitiveness ranged from 100% confident the defendant is guilty of manslaughter 
(-100) to 100% confident the defendant is guilty of second degree murder (+100). 
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Figure 4. The effect of individual guilt predicting punitiveness as a function of national 
identification. Punitiveness ranged from 100% confident the defendant is guilty of manslaughter 
(-100) to 100% confident the defendant is guilty of second degree murder (+100). 
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